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Abstract
Four experiments examined the effect of input sequence on memory for simple
stories. After reading stories written in either chronological or flashback
sequence, subjects made a decision about the underlying order of occurrence
of two events. Responses were consistently faster and more accurate on
chronological sequences under three conditions of testing: immediately after
reading, after a 10-second unfilled interval, and after a 10-second filled
interval. It was also shown that decisions about input order were easier
than decisions about underlying order when the stories contained flashbacks.
These data indicate that subjects based their responses on a memory
representation which preserved the input sequence of events. An additional
finding was that decisions were easier when the events in the story had a
logical progression rather than an arbitrary ordering, demonstrating an
influence of prior knowledge.
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Processing Temporal Relationships in Simple Stories:
Effects of Input Sequence
All of our experiences with words occur over time due to the sequential
nature of language. The question of interest in the present paper is the
extent to which real-time order information influences memory for simple
stories. A story is an ideal discourse structure to use in this context
because its representation is temporally marked in two ways: 1) it is
encoded over time, and 2) it contains explicit or implicit information about
the temporal sequence of events within the story itself (story time).
In most texts, input order (real time) is perfectly confounded with
story time in that the order of presentation of the events is the same as the
order in which they occur in the story. When the temporal organization of
the story matches the temporal record of the input, it should be relatively
easy to represent the order of events in memory. The representation problem
becomes more complex when story time is inconsistent with real time, e.g.,
when the story contains a flashback. Here, readers cannot rely on an
episodic temporal record of experience to provide information about the
ordering of events in the story, but must try to keep track of the
inversions.
The sentence memory literature provides some evidence that this
inconsistency would pose a problem. Clark and Clark (1968) presented
subjects with 2-event sentences connected by temporal adverbs and cued them
for verbatim recall. In general, sentences were more poorly recalled when
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the order of input was different from the underlying order of occurrence.
Using the same stimulus materials, Smith and McMahon (1970) asked subjects to
report what happened first or second immediately after presentation of a
sentence. Longer response times resulted when order of input differed from
order of occurrence.
These experiments suggest that the temporal order of input dominates the
memory code for single sentences. However, the general consensus in the
prose literature is that surface characteristics of a text, including order
of input, have little bearing on the memory representation (e.g., Kintsch,
1974). Several experiments have demonstrated that subjects tend to recall
semantically related ideas together even if they had not been presented
together at input (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Meyer & McConkie, 1973; Meyers &
Boldrick, 1976; Stein & Nezworski, in press; Thorndyke, 1977). Such
reorganization could, of course, occur at retrieval and does not necessarily
reflect the structure of the memory representation. However, Kintsch and
Monk (1972) and King and Greeno (1974) obtained evidence for constructive
processing using a response time paradigm. They concluded that people
extract the main ideas from a text and create a coherent, well-structured
representation as they are reading.
The present series of experiments takes issue with this exclusive focus
on meaning, specifically, the contention that surface characteristics are
lost during the effort to construct a coherent semantic interpretation. This
focus characterizes several memory models which assume the semantic
representation is invariant under paraphrases of the same information
Input Sequence
4
(Anderson & Bower, 19735; Kintsch, 1974; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Schank,
1972). Such models would presumably represent information in the same
abstract propositional format regardless of the specific temporal adverbial
that is used. For example, the sentences, "Bill cut the grass. Before that,
he went to the store" and "Bill went to the store. Then he cut the grass,"
should entail formally equivalent representations.
This invariance assumption underlies linguistic models which explicitly
consider the temporal relations existing among events in a story. For
example, van Dijk (1972) suggests that when reading text, referential/real
time points and intervals are mapped onto semantically represented times.
Each event is mapped onto a sentoid representing an abstract idea, along with
its corresponding time indicator. Even if the direct relationship between
real time (input order) and semantic time (underlying order) does not obtain,
the mapping is still the same. Similarly, Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976)
suggest that incoming events are mapped onto a conceptual time line. In
other words, inconsistencies between real time and underlying story time are
resolved in favor of story time.
Existing story grammars also emphasize the dominance of the underlying
order of events (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, in press). One of
the major assumptions of a story grammar is that a story has a canonical
order. If a story violates the expected temporal order of events, people
attempt to re-organize the information to conform to the canonical story
schema. Evidence in support of this argument has been provided by Mandler
(in press), Stein and Nezworski (in press), and Kintsch, Kozminski, and
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Mandel (1977). These investigators presented subjects with stories
containing various temporal disruptions and then asked for recall or
summarization of the stories. In general, subjects produced protocols that
bore a closer resemblance to the ideal story sequence than to the actual
input sequence. Although it may be tempting to argue that this
reorganization occurs during encoding, conclusive evidence is lacking.
In summary, virtually all of the studies examining memory for prose have
focused on the construction of a meaningful, well-integrated representation
and have ignored the possible contributions of surface information. The goal
of the present experiments is to demonstrate that certain surface
characteristics, specifically, the order of input, do in fact exert an
influence on memory. The basic paradigm involved presenting subjects with
paragraph-length stories written in either chronological or flashback
sequence. After reading each story, subjects were asked to decide if the
order in which two events were displayed in a probe matched the underlying
order of occurrence in the story.
If the memory representation preserves the order of input, then subjects
should be faster and more accurate making decisions on chronological stories
than on flashback stories. This advantage would be due to the fact that
input sequence is identical to underlying sequence in chronological stories,
but subjects must figure out the underlying sequence of events before they
can respond on flashback stories. On the other hand, if the representation
is integrated during processing to conform to the underlying sequence of
events, then performance on flashback stories should not differ from
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chronological. Such an outcome would be consistent with the contention that
subjects extract and represent the same meaning from different surface
expressions of similar ideas.
Four experiments will be reported which seek to demonstrate better
access of input order relationships than temporal relationships existing in
the meaning of the story. In the first experiment, subjects were tested
immediately after reading the story. The second experiment introduced a
brief interval between study and test to provide an opportunity for
"consolidation" of the representation, while an interference task was used in
Experiment 4 to disrupt verbatim memory. A somewhat different procedure was
used in Experiment 3, where decisions about flashback stories were based on
either the underlying order in story time or on real-time input order.
(Throughout the paper, the terms "real time" and "input order" will be used
interchangeably, as will "story time" and "underlying order.")
In addition to the chronological-flashback manipulation, the experiments
also varied the type of connection existing among the events in the stories.
Some stories contained an arbitrarily-ordered series of events, with no
semantic constraints on the ordering. The remaining stories contained events
which followed a logical progression but were not causally related. It was
expected that decisions would be faster and more accurate on logically-
ordered stories because they conform to past experience. This advantage
could arise because the semantic constraints facilitated the construction of
a well-integrated representation at encoding. The advantage could also
originate at retrieval; prior knowledge can be used to facilitate decisions
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on logical orderings, whereas on arbitrary orderings, subjects can only use
information encoded during the experiment.
The encoding explanation also predicts an interaction between sequence
and connection; it should be easier to reorganize logical flashback stories
to conform to the underlying sequence than arbitrary flashback stories.
Thus, an interaction would provide additional evidence that subjects
attempted to construct an integrated representation during processing.
Similar predictions have received support from Kintsch et al. (1977) and
Brown and Murphy (1975).
Experiment 1
Method
Stories. The stimulus materials consisted of 76 simple stories, each
about 60 words in length. Each story described a series of three events
experienced by a protagonist in a particular situation. The stories were all
of similar structure; there was an introductory setting statement, followed
by three sentences, each of which described one major event. The fifth and
final sentence contained a concluding comment of some sort.
Each story was originally written in chronological sequence such that
the order the events were mentioned was the order they occurred in the
story. The temporal contiguity between events was always made explicit by
markers such as "Next," "Then," "A short time later." The stories were
rewritten into flashback versions, where order of mention differed from order
of occurrence. Only one event was involved in the flashback, and it was
always mentioned immediately after the event which had actually followed it
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in the story. The flashback was typically signalled by the phrase, "Before
that," where all references to the previous event were pronominal. Since
each story had three events, there were two possible flashback sequences,
given the above constraints. The flashback reversed the order of mention of
either the first and second events or the second and third. Half of the
stories contained one type of flashback and half the other. This
manipulation was included in order to prevent subjects from knowing in
advance which two events would be involved in the flashback and therefore
focusing their attention on those two events. It should be noted that the
untested first and last sentences served to eliminate possible end-anchor
effects (c.f. Potts, 1975).
In addition to the chronological-flashback variable, the stories
differed with respect to the type of connections existing between the events.
In half of the stories, the three events were independent. Although they
were related to a particular theme, there were no logical connections between
them. Thus, the three events could be rearranged in any order without
affecting the meaningfulness of the story. In the remaining stories, the
order of events was semantically constrained. Strictly speaking, the events
were not causal ly related, but they did have an expected sequence based on
knowledge of the "script" (Schank, 1975) for the situation. The two types of
connections will be designated "arbitrary" and "logical," respectively, but
the term "logical" should not be misunderstood as entailing a CAUSE
relationship. Both types of connections can be represented formally by THEN
relations (c.f. Mandler & Johnson, 1977), but the logical are more
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constrained than the arbitrary. Examples of the stories are presented in
Table 1.2
In making up the set of materials to be used in the experiment, half of
the stories containing each type of connection were randomly selected to
appear in flashback version, half in chronological. Ten stories were
designated as practice items, and 10 as filler items. The remaining 56
stories, 14 of each of the four types, were randomly arranged for the test
stimulus set, with the filler items evenly interspersed among them.
Insert Table 1 about here
Probes. A test probe was constructed for each story and consisted of
two phrases separated by 10 dots. Each phrase was sufficient to specify one
event in the story. The subjects' task was to decide if the order of the
phrases (from left to right) was the same as the order those events took
place in the story. Examples of the probes are included in Table 1. The
probes were presented as phrases rather than as complete sentences in order
to simplify the task requirements and to reduce the possibility of verbatim
matches with the surface form of the text. Sixty percent of the probes were
true with respect to the story and 40% were false.
The two events included in the probe were the two events inverted by the
flashback, or, in the case of chronological sequences, the two events that
were inverted in the corresponding flashback version. Since subjects could
conceivably adopt a strategy of anticipating the probe on the basis of the
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inverted events, 10 fillers were included. Here, the probe tested the
temporal relationship between the first and third events, rather than the
combination of events involved in the flashback.
Equipment. Stimulus presentation was under the control of a PDP-11/40
computer. The stories were displayed in upper case letters on 9-inch video
monitors at seven individual subject stations. The entire story was
presented on the screen at one time, followed by the probe. Each station was
equipped with two response buttons. The right button was labeled "true" and
the left was labeled "false." Responses and response latencies were recorded
by the computer.
Design. A 2 x 2 within-subjects design was used, with two story
sequences (flashback or chronological) and two types of connections between
events (arbitrary or logical). Nineteen Rutgers College students
participated in the experiment as part of a general psychology course
requirement.
Procedure. Subjects were told that they would be reading a series of
short stories, each containing an ordered sequence of three main events.
They were also told that sometimes the events would be mentioned in the order
they occured in the story, but that sometimes the events would be mentioned
out of sequence, as in a flashback. The probes were then described, and
subjects were instructed to base their responses on the underlying order of
events, that is, the order that the characters in the story experienced the
events. It was emphasized that this order would sometimes be different from
the order of mention. Subjects were instructed to press the "true" button if
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the probe matched the underlying order in the story, and to press "false" if
not. They were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
The experimenter read a sample flashback story and probe, carefully
explaining what the correct response would be and why. The connection
manipulation was not mentioned in the instructions as this knowledge was not
deemed necessary.
After answering any questions the subjects had, ten practice trials were
administered. Each story was presented for 20 seconds, which was sufficient
time to read through the story once. The probe appeared 1.5 seconds later
and remained on the screen for 9 seconds or until all subjects responded,
whichever came first. The experimenter monitored the performance of the
subjects during the practice trials, and provided feedback about their
general performance levels. After ascertaining that all subjects were
comfortable with the task, the test trials were begun. Again, each story was
presented for 20 seconds followed by a probe for a maximum of 9 seconds.
There were two 2-minute rest periods during the experiment. The entire
session lasted about 50 minutes.
Results and Discussion
The data obtained in all experiments were treated in a similar fashion.
The following general comments pertain to all analyses. Response times and
error rates were subjected to separate 2 x 2 analyses of variance, with story
sequence (chronological or flashback) and type of connection (arbitrary or
logical) as factors. Each dependent variable was analyzed twice, once with
subjects as the random factor and once with items. Because of the limited
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number of items per condition and because of the relatively high error rates,
it was not feasible to enter both subject and item effects into a single
analysis. Moreover, the complete lack of random selection of stimuli
prohibits generality beyond the present sample, and yet an analysis
collapsing over subjects provides assurance that the results are at least
robust within this sample. To facilitate presentation of the results, F
ratios from the subject analyses will be designated F , those from the item
analyses, F2 . The rejection region is p < .05 for all tests. True and false
-'2
decisions were analyzed separately, and the pattern of results was quite
similar. In the interest of brevity, the false judgments will not be
discussed in the text. However, the means on false decisions will be
presented in the appropriate tables along with the true decisions. A summary
of the relevant statistical tests on false judgments can be found in the
appendix.
The mean response times on correct decisions are given in Table 2, with
the corresponding error probabilities indicated in parentheses. (All means
represent subject means.) Analyses of variance of response times on true
Insert Table 2 about here
decisions revealed a reliable effect of sequence, FI (1,72) = 6.14,
MS = 538,137; F (1,26) = 4.96, MS = 345,169. As expected, latencies were
-- e
considerably longer on probes for flashback sequences than for chronological.
This suggests that the initial representation of the story was organized
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according to input sequence. It takes time to calculate the correct event
sequence if underlying order differs from surface order. Although the
response times in Table 2 suggest an advantage of logical connections over
arbitrary, neither analysis of variance reached conventional significance
levels. There was no evidence of an interaction between story sequence and
type of connection.
Analyses of the error data reveal parallel effects. The main effect of
sequence was reliable, FI(1,72) = 7.37, MS = .0183; F2 (1,26) = 9.50,
MS = 2.63. More errors were made on decisions about flashback sequences
-- e
than on chronological, reflecting a tendency to respond on the basis of input
order rather than underlying order. The main effect of connection was also
reliable, j (1,72) = 5.32, MS = .0183; F2 (1,26) = 6.01, MS = 2.63,
--e - -e
confirming expectations. Errors were more likely when the events in the
story were arbitrarily ordered than when they were logically related. As
with response times, there was no evidence of an interaction.
The results obtained in the present experiment demonstrate that the
initial representation of a story is affected by the temporal order of input.
If real time and story time are consistent, as they are in chronological
paragraphs, subjects are faster and more accurate in responding than if they
are inconsistent. In addition, the experiment demonstrates a role of prior
knowledge such that if the sequence of events follows a logical progression,
decisions about order are facilitated.
It is possible that subjects were trying to create a semantically
integrated representation, but with an immediate test they may not have had
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time to sort out the story time relations. If this is true, perhaps
differences between chronological and flashback sequences would be eliminated
if subjects are given additional time after reading the passage to reorganize
their internal representation of the story. On the other hand, if subjects
are satisfied with a real-time ordering of their representation, then a brief
delay should not change the pattern of results. Experiment 2 was addressed
to this question.
Experiment 2
Method
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 in all respects, except
that a 10-second unfilled interval was introduced between story and probe
presentation. Subjects received the same instructions, but they were also
explicitly encouraged to establish and rehearse the story-time ordering of
events during the interval. Ten Rutgers College students participated in the
experiment in partial fulfillment of a general psychology course requirement.
The experiment lasted about 60 minutes.
Results and Discussion
Mean response times for correct decisions are presented in Table 3, with
corresponding error rates indicated in parentheses. Analyses of response
latencies on true decisions revealed a reliable effect of sequence, FI(1,36)
= 7.25, MS = 312,716; F(1,26) = 6.77, MS = 241,899. As in Experiment 1,
--- e-e
response times on flashback sequences were consistently longer than on
chronological. The connection effect also replicates Experiment 1,
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Fr(1,36) = 5.04, MS = 312,716; F2 (1,26) = 5.61, MS = 241,899; logicale -e
Insert Table 3 about here
relations among events facilitate decisions about order. There was no
evidence of an interaction between sequence and connection.
The introduction of an unfilled interval did not eliminate or even
reduce the differences between chronological and flashback stories. Input
sequence still seems to be the primary basis of organization in memory. If
the data from the two experiments are combined, treating retention interval
as a between-subjects factor, the effect of interval is reliable, F1 (1,27) =
5.87, MS = 1,291,832; latencies were longer on the delayed test than on the
--- e
immediate test. This difference probably arose because the delay subjects
were not sure exactly when the probe would be presented and so had slower
reaction times (cf. Kahneman & Henir, 1977). Of more importance than the main
effect, however, was the lack of any interactions with interval. Thus,
although subjects required more time to respond on the delayed test, the
retention interval did not differentially influence performance.
Analyses of the error data revealed a reliable effect of sequence,
F (1,36) = 12.58, MS = .01312; F (1,26) = 7.93, MS = 1.49, with more errors
- -e '-2e
on flashback stories than on chronological. Providing subjects with
additional time to think about the story did not reduce error rates on
flashback sequences relative to the immediate test. The effect of connection
was not reliable, nor was there an interaction between sequence and
connection.
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The results of this experiment essentially replicate those obtained in
Experiment 1, further attesting to the organizing influence of the temporal
record of input. The results on the immediate test might be explained by
claiming that subjects simply did not have time to fully integrate the
material before being tested. However, the extra 10 seconds of unfilled time
in Experiment 2 should have allowed a semantically integrated representation
if this was the-subject's goal. Clearly, subjects did not create such an
integrated representation either during processing or in the unfilled
interval after reading. The delayed results are all the more surprising
given that subjects were explicitly told to think about the underlying order
of events during the retention interval. It could be argued that subjects
did not follow instructions and rehearsed the events in their order of
presentation, even when it was not always to their advantage. However, this
strategy would not be adopted unless it was easier to deal with episodic
order information than with meaning. This is, in fact, what the present
paper is trying to demonstrate empirically.
Experiment 3
The data from Experiments 1 and 2 are certainly consistent with the idea
of a temporal organization in memory. However, the differences in responses
to chronological and flashback sequences have at least one alternative
explanation. Perhaps two representations are established when reading a
story. One representation might be ordered by real time to preserve a record
of the input, and the other might be an abstracted semantic representation
that would provide a more permanent logical record of events. This second
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record would presumably be ordered by story time as opposed to real clock
time. In the case of a chronological input story, the two representations
would be completely redundant. However, with flashback stories, there would
be a discrepancy between the two memory records. The presence of two
conflicting representations might retard decisions and increase errors.
In view of this alternative interpretation, the data do not
unequivocably demonstrate that the stories are represented in memory
according to the temporal order of input. A more definitive test would
entail separate assessments of memory for real time and story time. This
task was undertaken in the present experiment by presenting subjects with
flashback stories and requiring an order decision about either the order of
occurrence in story time or the order of mention in real time. If two
equally accessible representations do exist, one would expect no differences
in performance because a flashback creates a conflict in both situations.
That is, a real-time response requires subjects to ignore the underlying
story-time sequence, while a story-time response requires them to ignore the
real-time order of input.
However, if the initial representation is organized according to input
sequence, then subjects should be faster making a decision when they are told
to use real time as the basis of the answer, even though they must ignore the
semantic markers signalling the occurrence of a flashback. Such an outcome
would not, of course, rule out the existence of a semantic representation,
but it would demonstrate the advantage of a temporally organized record.
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Method
Materials. The stimulus materials were the same as those used in the
preceding experiments, except that all stories appeared in their flashback
versions. The test probes were also the same, but the proportion of true and
false decisions was 50-50 rather than 60-40.
Design. The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial. The within-
subjects factors were type of connection between events (arbitrary or
logical) and test question (real-time or story-time). The between-subjects
factor was block order. One group of subjects received real-time questions
on the first half of the trials and story-time questions on the second half
(R-S). A second group received story-time questions on the first trial block
and real-time questions on the second (S-R). The order of presentation of
the stories was constant across block orders; thus, block order was a
within-items factor. A total of 28 subjects participated in the experiment,
drawn from the Rutgers introductory psychology subject pool. There were 11
subjects in Block R-S and 17 subjects in Block S-R.
Procedure. Subjects were informed that all of the stories they would be
reading contained flashbacks and that the ordering of the events was
particularly important. They were told that on half of the trials, they
would be expected to base their answer to the probe on the order that the
events were mentioned in the text, and on the remaining trials, they should
respond according to the order the events took place in the story itself. A
sample story was presented, along with sample probes. Care was taken to make
sure that subjects understood the task, particularly the distinction between
real time and story time.
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The procedure was basically the same as in Experiment 1. The story was
presented for 20 seconds followed after 1.5 seconds by the probe. The first
five practice trials required real-time responses, the last five were based
on story time. The test trials were preceded by a message instructing
subjects to base their answers on either real time or story time until
instructed otherwise. After half of the trials had been presented, subjects
were given a 3-minute rest period. They were then instructed to base their
answers to the remaining probes on story or real time, whichever question
type they did not receive in the first trial block. The entire experiment
lasted about 60 minutes.
Results and Discussion
The mean response times and error probabilities are presented in
Table 4. The question of primary interest was whether real time decisions are
easier than story time decisions. Analyses of the true response latencies
provided an affirmative answer. The effect of test question was reliable,
F (1,26) = 18.66, MS = 380,783; F (1,45) = 8.61, MS = 319,468, with faster* -e -2 --e
responses when decisions were based on input order. However, the magnitude
of this effect depended both on the type of connection existing between the
events and the order in which the two types of test questions were presented.
Insert Table 4 about here
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This is indicated by the triple interaction of question x connection x block,
FI(1,26) = 7.74, MS = 240,056; F.(1,45) = 4.30, MS = 319,468. This
interaction also qualifies the effect of connection, FI(1,26) = 4.39,
MS = 241,641, its interaction with question, FI(1,26) = 8.74, MS = 240,056,
-e
and its interaction with block, F (1,26) = 15.57, MS = 241,641;
F 2(1,45) = 7.45, MS = 319,468.
These interactions can be expressed verbally as follows: If real time
was tested before story time (Block R-S), response times on logical and
arbitrary stories were roughly equivalent. If story time was tested first
(Block S-R), arbitrary paragraphs were faster than logical. However, this
effect occurred primarily when the test question was based on real time. The
results can best be understood by inspection of the top half of Table 4,
which reveals one cell entry which is strikingly lower than any other. This
cell mean represents the experimental condition of arbitrary connection, real
time question, Block S-R.
The triple interaction was unexpected and difficult to interpret, but it
clearly implicates some differences in processing strategies. The general
finding that real time is an easier basis of responding than story time may
be due to the fact that the story need not be processed as extensively. The
semantic relationships between events do not have to be encoded, subjects
need only abstract enough information to create a representation of input
order. The test on story time clearly poses more difficulty since the
semantic markers must be taken into account. It appears that if this more
difficult task is presented first, subjects find the real-time task easier,
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provided the story contains arbitrary connections between events. If the
ordering is logical, subjects seem to have difficulty switching from a
semantic processing strategy to one which ignores the semantic relationships
existing between the events. It is more difficult to give the "wrong" answer
(ignoring the flashback) when it goes against an ordering reinforced by prior
knowledge. In the case of arbitrary stories, subjects can more easily ignore
the semantic components of the ordering because they are only based on
episodic contiguity. In this condition, then, subjects benefit from having
had practice on the more difficult task first and show a large decrease in
latencies.
The error data are somewhat easier to interpret because the triple
interaction was not significant. Again, the effect of primary interest, test
question, was reliable, FI(1,26) = 28.81, MS = .019; F2 (1,45) = 5.85,
MS = .010. More errors were made when the questions involved underlying
order of occurrence rather than input sequence. The interaction of question
and block was reliable on the item analysis of variance, F2 (1,45) = 5.31,
MS = .010. The difference in error rates between real time and story time
questions was very small for three of four comparisons; however, on arbitrary
passages tested in Block S-R the difference was 22%. This outcome parallels
the response latencies: error rates were highest when the harder story-time
questions were presented first; they dropped markedly when the easier real
time was tested. A slightly different pattern emerges in the subject
analysis, where the question by connection interaction was reliable,
IFi(1,26) = 13.51, MS = .01. When the events were arbitrarily connected,
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there were 22% fewer errors on real time questions, but when logical
connections existed between the events, there were only 6% fewer errors.
This again indicates that it is harder to ignore semantic markers when they
are based on pre-experimental knowledge than when they only have an episodic
basis. This effect obtained regardless of block order.
In summary, these data provide further evidence that the initial
representation of a story preserves the temporal record of input and rule out
the explanation that the effect occurs only because real time is consistent
with story time. Surface order retains its advantage even when it is
inconsistent with the underlying semantic organization of the story. The
interactions with block order suggest that subjects were adopting task-
specific strategies. Nevertheless, the fact remains that subjects were
generally better at making judgments about order of input than about
underlying order.
Experiment 4
It is possible that temporal organization exerts its influence only on
an immediate test. A number of studies have shown that surface information
is well-remembered immediately after processing but with interference and/or
the passage of time, people come to rely on a more general memory of meaning
(e.g., Anderson, 1974; Garrod & Trabasso, 1973; McKoon, 1977; Smith &
McMahon, 1970). Experiment 2 suggests at least some persistence, but how
fragile is this temporally-ordered memory? Would it disappear if the test
was not only delayed but an interference task was introduced? Thfs
possibility was examined in the present experiment using a paradigm similar
Input Sequence
23
to that of Experiments 1 and 2. If real-time information is but briefly
retained, then the advantage of chronological over flashback stories should
be eliminated. However, if temporal organization has some robustness, then
differences should still obtain. A 10-second interference task was
introduced between story and probe presentation and consisted of detecting
spelling errors in a list of difficult-to-spell words. The duration of this
task is admittedly short, but a longer task destroys the sensitivity of the
latency measure. A preliminary study using a 15-second interference task
resulted in large but equivalent increases in errors and response times on
both sequence types. As it was, a few procedural modifications were
necessary to ensure better-than-chance accuracy: the number of stories was
reduced to prevent excessive fatigue; reading times were subject-controlled
and maximum response times were increased.
Method
Materials. The stimulus materials were the same as those used
previously, but logical stories were not included. Subjects received a total
of 40 stories, 8 practice and 32 test. Half were in chronological sequence
and half flashback. This reduction in the number of passages was an effort
to prevent subject fatigue in light of the difficult distractor task. The
arbitrary stories were chosen over the logical to eliminate effects of prior
knowledge. A filled interval might conceivably produce sufficient forgetting
that subjects would adopt a guessing strategy, which would lead to greater
success on logical than on arbitrary passages. Such a guessing strategy
would obscure differences between chronological and flashback paragraphs
which might otherwise be apparent.
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The probes were the same as those used previously, but they were
displayed in a different format. The phrases were arranged one on top of the
other rather than appearing on a single line. The task was to decide whether
the event on top preceded the event on the bottom in order of occurrence in
the story. Twenty of the test probes required true decisions, and 12 false.
Eight hundred words were selected for use in the interference task,
drawn from a collection of difficult-to-spell words (Callihan, 1957). Half
of the words were spelled correctly and half contained an error.
Procedure. The experiment was under the control of the PLATO computer
system at the University of Illinois. Subjects received detailed
instructions in written form, and were given an opportunity to ask questions
of the experimenter. Each subject sat at a video terminal equipped with a
typewriter-like keyboard. Subjects were instructed to hold their right index
finger above the "y" key, to be used for a "yes" (true) response, and their
left index finger over the "n" key, to be used for a "no" (false) response.
The sequence of steps in the experiment was as follows: subjects signed onto
the system individually and were instructed via the computer to press the key
labeled "next" in order to see the first story. Once they did so, the story
was written onto the screen. The subjects were permitted to read through the
story at their own pace (with a maximum of 32 seconds), indicating by a key
press when they had finished. Reading times were recorded by the computer.
The key press initiated the interference task. Twenty words were displayed
on the screen, in four columns of five words each. Subjects proceeded down
the columns, pressing the "y" key if the word was spelled correctly, the "n"
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key if it was incorrect. Preliminary testing showed it was virtually
impossible to respond to all 20 words within the allotted time. At the end
of 10 seconds, the list was erased and the word "Probe" appeared, followed by
the probe itself. Taking into consideration the time required by the
computer to change displays, the delay between story and probe presentation
was actually about 15 seconds. Subjects responded "y" if the order of events
in the probe matched the underlying order in the story and "n" if not; the
response was printed on the screen. If a subject failed to respond within 15
seconds, a "time-up" message appeared. This 3-step sequence constituted one
trial. Subjects then pressed "next" for presentation of the next passage,
initiating trial 2. This sequence was repeated through eight practice
trials, after which an opportunity for questions was provided. The
subjects then self-initiated the 32 test trials. Responses and response
times were recorded by the computer. A 2-minute rest period was provided
after 16 trials, during which subjects watched an animated display on the
PLATO screen. The entire session lasted about 50 minutes.
Subjects. Subjects were 20 University of Illinois undergraduates
enrolled in an educational psychology course. Participation in the
experiment partially fulfilled a course requirement.
Results and Discussion
The dependent measures of interest were reading times, response times,
and error rates. No data were collected on the interference task, but the
experimenter observed subjects for compliance with the instructions. The
differences between chronological and flashback means were analyzed using
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t-tests for correlated samples. A summary of the results is presented in
Insert Table 5 about here
Table 5. The experiment replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2 in
that subjects required more time to respond to the probe on flashback
sequences than on chronological, t(19) = 5.25, and flashback sequences
resulted in higher error rates, t(19) = 3.69. Quite clearly, the
interference task did not eliminate the differences between chronological and
flashback sequences. This indicates that real time has some persistence in
the memory representation.
Analysis of the reading times revealed that subjects required more time
to read flashback than chronological sequences, t(19) = 2.18, suggesting that
the inverted sequences were more complex and/or difficult to comprehend. It
is true that the flashback stories generally contained one more word than the
chronological ("before that" vs. "then"), but it is unlikely that this would
produce significantly longer reading times. More importantly, it is also
unlikely that the increased reading times reflected an attempt to reorganize
the story to conform to its underlying sequence. Had this strategy been
adopted, the response times and error rates would not have been greater on
flashback sequences. One possible explanation for the increase is that
subjects required additional time to identify the antecedent of the pronoun
"that" in the flashbacks (Garrod & Sanford, 1977).
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The present experiment substantially weakens the argument that subjects
maintain a surface order representation for a brief period of time, but that
they rely primarily on meaning. Had this been true, the interference task
should have eliminated the transitory surface representation, leaving the
underlying representation intact. Theories which stress the role of semantic
structure in memory representation would predict that the story is
reorganized during processing to conform to the underlying sequence,
resulting in formally equivalent representations for both types of input.
Therefore, assuming that the interference task displaced the competing
surface representation, performance levels on the delayed test should be
comparable. The fact that the advantage of chronological stories was not
eliminated poses a problem for this theoretical position. The temporal
record of input apparently exerts a greater organizing influence than the
temporal relationships inherent in the meaning of the story.
General Discussion
The present series of experiments has demonstrated that episodic
information, specifically information about the temporal order of input, has
a strong influence on the immediate representation of simple stories.
Experiment 1 showed that people are faster and more accurate at answering
questions about the order events took place in a story when the order of
mention was the same as the order of occurrence. This was also observed in
the second experiment when subjects were given an opportunity to extract and
rehearse the underlying story sequence. The third experiment demonstrated
that people are better at making decisions on the basis of input sequence
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than underlying sequence. The advantage of input order is not simply due to
retention of a fragile surface representation, since the effect remains with
an interference task in Experiment 4.
The primary goal of the experiments, to demonstrate the influence of
input sequence on memory of simple stories, has been realized. A secondary
goal was to demonstrate an effect of the type of connection between events.
It was expected that when events within a story are logically related,
decisions would be easier than when events are linked by temporal contiguity
alone. This prediction was based on the assumption that the sequence of
events in such a story is compatible with real world sequences and that the
possibility of relating the sequence to prior knowledge allows the subject to
create a more coherent representation of the story. The events in an
arbitrarily-connected story are only linked with respect to that particular
episode, and so underlying order information is harder to access. The
results of Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with expectations: response
times were shorter and error rates were lower on logical stories. In
Experiment 3, the interactions with block order make the effect of connection
difficult to interpret.
Given that logical stories were easier to deal with than arbitrary, it
is somewhat surprising that there was no evidence of an interaction with
sequence. Because the underlying order of events in a logical story conforms
to an expected sequence, one might expect less difficulty on flashback
sequences than when the events are arbitrarily ordered. In other words,
subjects should be more likely to create a representation that is integrated
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with respect to the underlying order. The absence of an interaction
strengthens the argument against the claim that stories are re-structured
during processing to conform to an ideal schema (e.g., Kintsch et al., 1977).
The facilitatory effects of logical connections probably occurred at the time
of test; it was easier to access the correct ordering because prior knowledge
could be used as well as episodic information. This advantage operated
equally on chronological and flashback sequences.
The present experiments also have bearing on the issue of paraphrase
invariance. Several models of memory contend that information is represented
in an abstract propositional format, such that a given conceptual idea has a
common representation regardless of its exact surface realization. On this
view, chronological and flashback versions of the same story should have the
same formal representation, since they contain the same underlying ideas and
differ only in surface expression. However, the consistent differences in
response times and error rates for chronological and flashback sequences
argue against this position. Without posing an alternative model, the modest
claim can still be made that the representations differ.
One problem with the invariance model arises from the lack of a precise
definition for paraphrase (Anderson, 1976). Although the chronological and
flashback versions of a given story seem to have the same general meaning, it
is not clear they are actually paraphrases of one another. Miller and
Johnson-Laird (1976) argue that subtle differences in meaning exist depending
on the way a temporal relationship is expressed. For example, different
presuppositions are involved depending on whether the subordinate clause of a
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sentence contains the word "before" or "after." Similarly, Stein (in press)
suggests that flashbacks may alter the number and types of inferences that
are made during reading. Another problem for the invariance model is the
content-free aspect of prose known as signalling (Meyer, 1975). A flashback
could be regarded as a form of signalling; it does not add new content or
relationships to the text, but increases the salience of particular events,
perhaps imparting a different perspective on the story. This technique
serves an important stylistic function, but its effects on memory have not
been considered.
In conclusion, the present experiments attest to a weakness in models of
prose representation which emphasize meaning. Most people undoubtedly do try
to make sense of things while reading, but it is unlikely that they engage in
the sophisticated restructuring strategies for which they are credited. Not
only does the memory representation preserve the order of input, it also
contains other surface characteristics of text. Though not wishing to claim
that people have verbatim memory, even for stories as short as those used in
these experiments, it is clear that they remember much more specific
information than an abstract propositional representation would allow.
The experiments also have some practical implications for educators. It
is generally agreed that meaning is not inherent in a text, but rather is
constructed by the reader in an interactive process involving both surface
information and world knowledge. Clearly, an assessment of the knowledge a
reader has acquired from text must not restrict itself to tests of verbatim
memory. However, the present experiments indicate that information derived
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from a text is not re-structured into a semantically-consistent
representation during reading, but rather that it is organized according to
the order of input. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the reader
automatically integrates related ideas into a coherent structure. The
proficient reader probably can reconstruct a meaningfully organized text, but
the less skilled reader may have difficulty establishing interconnections
among ideas that are not presented contiguously in the text. This implies
that comprehension will be facilitated if information is presented in an
order that is consistent with the logical flow of ideas.
The experiments also provide further evidence that people make use of
prior knowledge in new learning situations. Subjects' responses were faster
and more accurate when the to-be-remembered information conformed to a
familiar and predictable situation. Brown and Murphy (1975) have
demonstrated a similar facilitation in young children; the present
experiments indicate that it does not diminish with the increased memory
skills of adults. An obvious implication for education is that efforts
should be made to present information to students in such a way that it makes
contact with existing knowledge.
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It should be noted that these passages do not conform to an ideal story
structure because they are not strictly goal-oriented and lack one or more
types of information required by story grammars (e.g., Stein & Glenn, in
press). A more appropriate label might be "narrative," but I find it simpler
to refer to them as stories.
2 In order to corroborate the psychological validity of this dichotomy, a
post-hoc norming study was carried out. Materials were constructed such that
on each of the 56 test stories, the first and last sentences remained in
their appropriate positions, but the three middle sentences were rearranged
in a random order. All temporal markers were eliminated from the sentences
so as not to provide clues about ordering. In addition, all pronouns were
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replaced by nouns so that referential style would not serve as an ordering
cue. Ten subjects were instructed to arrange the three middle sentences into
the sequence they thought made the "best" story. They were told that in some
cases, one ordering would clearly be the best, while in other cases, no one
ordering would seem better than another. They were also instructed to
classify the story as containing either a logical ordering of events or an
arbitrary ordering.
Performance on the ordering task was as expected. On those stories
classified as logical, subjects consistently ordered the events in the
expected sequence, but there was no particular pattern in arranging the
events in the arbitrary stories. In addition, there was 95% agreement on the
classification task. Thus, the stories do conform to the guidelines by which
they were constructed.
3The dependent variable in the subject analyses was p_ (error), while in
the item analyses it was number of errors, thus accounting for the
discrepancies in the magnitude of the MS 's.
-- e
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Table 1
Examples of Stories and Probes
Arbitrary Connections
Chronological. Dan's friends asked him to help them move out of their
house. Dan dropped a filing cabinet, breaking the railing on the stair.
Then, he knocked a dresser into the wall and cracked the plaster. Next, he
dropped a porcelain lamp which shattered into tiny pieces. Dan was not a
good moving man.
Flashback. Dan's friends asked him to help them move out of their
house. He knocked a dresser into the wall and cracked the plaster. Before
that, Dan dropped a filing cabinet, breaking the railing on the stair.
Later, he dropped a porcelain lamp which shattered into tiny pieces. Dan was
not a good moving man.
Probe. broke railing.......... cracked plaster (true)
Logical Connections
Chronological. Mary's annual visit to the doctor was quite traumatic.
She had to spend two hours in the waiting room with a scolding mother and
four whining children. Then the nurse tried to take a blood sample and
couldn't find a vein until the 7th try. Later, Mary discovered that someone
had stolen her coat from the closet. She swore she'd never go back for
another check-up.
(Continued on following page)
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Table 1 (continued)
Flashback. Mary's annual visit to the doctor was quite traumatic. The
nurse tried to take a blood sample and couldn't find a vein until the 7th
try. Before that, Mary had to spend two hours in the waiting room with a
scolding mother and four whining chi dren. Later, Mary discovered that
someone had stolen her coat from the closet. She swore she'd never go back
for another check-up.
Probe. whining chiIdren..........blood sample (true)
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Table 2
Mean Response Times (in msec) and Error Probabilities
in Experiment 1
Chronological
Sequence
Flashback Mean
True decisions
Connection
Arbitrary
Logical
Mean
False Decisions
Connection
Arbitrary
Log i ca I
Mean
3327 (.09)
3137 (.04)
3232 (.07)
3442 (.04)
3244 (.03)
3343 (.04)
3747 (.19)
3550 (.11)
3649 (.15)
3973 (.23)
3607 (.12)
3790 (.18)
3537 (.14)
3344 (.08)
3708 (.14)
3426 (.08)
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Table 3
Mean Response Times (in msec) and Error Probabilities
in Experiment 2
Chronological
Sequence
Flashback Mean
True decisions
Connection
Arbitrary
Logical
Mean
False Decisions
Connection
Arbitrary
Logical
Mean
3910 (.04)
3571 (.04)
3740 (.04)
3722 (.06)
3662 (.05)
3692 (.06)
4444 (.16)
3989 (.18)
4216 (.17)
4690 (.20)
4301 (.18)
4496 (.19)
4177 (.10)
3780 (.11)
4206 (.13)
3982 (.12)
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Table 4
Mean Response Times (in msec) and Error Probabilities
in Experiment 3
Real time
Test question
Story time
True decisions
Block order S-R
Connection
Arbitrary
Logical
Mean
Block order R-S
Connection
Arbitrary
Logical
Mean
3085 (.02)
4205 (.12)
3645 (.07)
3935 (.03)
3775 (.05)
3855 (.04)
4269 (.26)
4301 (.15)
4285 (.21)
4343 (.23)
4150 (.13)
4247 (.18)
3677 (.14)
4253 (.14)
4139 (.13)
3962 (.09)
(Continued on following page)
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Table 4 (continued)
Real time
Test question
Story time Mean
FaIse Decisions
Block order S-R
Connection
Arbitrary
Logical
Mean
Block order R-S
Connection
Arbitrary
Log i ca Il
Mean
3873 (.15)
3892 (. 19)
3883 (.17)
4064 (.12)
4139 (.25)
4102 (.19)
4695 (.30)
4252 (.21)
4474 (.11)
3933 (.12)
4736 (.18)
4335 (.15)
4284 (.23)
4072 (.20)
3999 (.12)
4438 (.22)
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Table 5
Summary of Results in Experiment 4
Sequence
Chronological Flashback
True decisions
Response times (sec) 5.176 5.855
p (error) .04 .18
Reading times (sec) 23.597 24.472
False decisions
Response times (sec) 5.272 5.706
_ (error) .11 .22
Reading times (sec) 22.835 24.190
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Appendix
Summary of Significant Statistical Tests
on False Decisions
Experiment 1
Response Times
Sequence: Fi(1,72) = 7.38, MS = 514,575
Connection: F2(1,19) = 4.26, MS = 256,891
-2 -- e
p (error)
Sequence: F1 (1,72) = 16.39, MS = .0228
F2 (1,22) = 18.04, MS = 2.11
Connection: F (1,22) = 4.22, MS = 2.11
Experiment 2
Response Times
Sequence: FI ( 1 ,36) = 11.57, MS = 558,004
F2 (1,19) = 5.42, MS = 569,381
-e
p (error)
Sequence: F1 (1,36) = 5.77, MS = .03231
F2(1,19) = 7.76, MS = 1.09
(Continued on following page)
Input Sequence
46
Experiment 3
Response Times
Question: F1 (1,26)
F• (1,44)' 2
Connection x Block: F1 (1,26)
F(1 ,44)
-ý-2
Question x Connection x Block
. (1,26)
p (error)
Question:
Connection x Block:
F2(1,44)
F (1,26)
= 9.29,
= 4.52,
= 5.97,
= 7.98,
MS
MS
----
MS
MS
--- e
= 488,329
= 419,316
= 473,974
= 419,316
= 7.80, MS = 303,582
-e
4.23,
5.92,
MS
MS
.020
.017
Experiment 4 (Sequence)
Response times: t(19) = 1.89
p (error): t(19) = 2.24
Reading times: t(19) = 2.38
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